





Volume 30, Issue 4 
  




Amedeo Fossati  
Diem - University of Genoa 
Marcello Montefiori  
Diem - University of Genoa
Abstract 
In this note we analyse the provision of a pure public good with non constant production cost in the context of a 
federation of jurisdictions with two tiers of Government: the central and the local. The central government aims at 
welfare maximization but this objective is constrained to the use of lump sum transfer. Local governments aim at their 
own utility maximization and they behave according to the Nash rule. The production cost for the public good is 
affected by the jurisdiction's type (high or low) and by the quantity of the good that is produced. It is shown that a 
social welfare improvement might take place, in some circumstances, even without any central government 
intervention. On the other hand a first best is unreachable under the hypothesis of Nash behaviour and lump sum 
transfer among jurisdictions.
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     1  Introduction 
Public goods are not infrequent in real world and they may be considered as a particular case 
of  economic  externality  (Tresch,  2002).  Public  goods  models  are  used  to  explain  central 
government’s economic policies, and the  literature has shown  much  interest  in examining  how 
decentralized  Nash  equilibrium  might  approach  Pareto  efficiency  with  appropriate  incentive 
schemes  under  different  information  requirements.  Also  if  Williams  (1966)  claims  that  “the 
complex interactions that occur even in highly simplified situations make it impossible to predict a 
priori  whether  undersupply  or  oversupply  will  generally  result”,  with  perfect  information  the 
standard  literature  assess  that  when  a  public  good  is  privately  provided,  then  the  level  of  its 
provision turns to be at a lower level with respect to the optimal socially desirable one. However, in 
the context of fiscal federalism income redistribution might be ineffective, since (Warr 1983) shows 
that  the  overall  level  of  public  good  individually  supplied  might  be  independent  from  income 
redistribution. The neutrality theorem has been originally discussed by (Kemp 1984), which extends 
the  theorem  to the  case  of  more  than  one  public  good,  and  by (Bergstrom  et  al.  1986)  which 
“analyze  the  extent  to  which  government  provision  of  a  public  good  “crowds  out”  private 
contributions”.  At  any  rate,  the  discussion  has  highlighted  that:  i)  individuals  must  behave  as 
atomistic  utility  maximizers,  ii)  the  redistribution  of  income  has  to  take  place  among  current 
contributors of the public good, and iii) individuals must face an identical constant prices. Recent 
and growing literature on fiscal federalism relates with the implications of information asymmetry 
when local jurisdictions face different cost for the provision of public good (Cornes and Silva, 
2002; Huber and Runkel, 2006). Our model shows a close relation with the work of (Huber and 
Runkel 2006), but with some important differences: i) we consider a pure public good while they 
focus their analysis on “local public good”, i.e., a good which economic jurisdiction coincides with 
the administrative one; ii) they assume a separable utility function, whereas we don’t impose any 
condition on the utility function; iii) they implicitly assume the same utility function for all the 
jurisdiction types, while we allow utilities to vary among the jurisdiction types (high or low cost); 
iv) they extend their analysis to the context of asymmetric information while we only focus on the 
perfect information case; v) they consider different transfer policies while we limit our analysis to 
the lump sum. 
In this note, at first we provide the general rule that the Central Government has to follow in 
order to improve the social welfare by means of lump-sum transfer. This rule is provided in a fairly 
general setting, where no particular assumptions on utility and cost functions are set. The sign of the 
transfer, i.e., the direction from the high cost region to the low one or vice versa, is not a trivial 
result.  Secondly  we  define  the  conditions  that,  if  met,  allow  for  a  autonomous  (i.e.,  without 
requiring any Central Government intervention) money transfer among jurisdictions when the latter 
behave according to the Nash rule. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the model is presented. Section 3 analyses the 
first best outcome under perfect information. Section 4 analyses Nash equilibriums under different 
price hypothesis. Finally, in Section 4 some concluding remarks are presented. 
 
2  The model 
The model assumes an economic federation consisting of two tiers of government: a central 
government and two local governments (we will refer to these latter as regions). Regional utility 
directly represents the preferences of citizenship, since the local governments aim at individualistic 
utility maximization. Each region provides two goods: the private good y and the public good x. The 
production cost for the private good y is identical among jurisdictions and set equal to 1. The cost 
for the public good x differs according to the jurisdiction’s type. We distinguish between the low 
cost region’s type and the high one, denoting the former by the l index and the latter by the h index. 
The federation comprises a low cost type region l and a high cost region h
1. The type    h l i ,   
                                                 
1 The model can be easily extended assuming L>1 (l=1....L) number of low cost type identical regions and H>1 (h=1...H) of high 
cost identical regions   2
region faces an expenditure cost  ) , ( i i
i x E   on x which depends and increases both on the quantity of 
the public good xi provided, and on the θi cost parameter, assuming θh>θl. The latter characteristic is 






x E E E E    (the subscript indicates the 
variable with respect to which the E cost function has been derived, either at first or second order). 
The maximization problem that faces the region type    h l i ,   is given by  ) , (    X y U u Max i
i i  , 
where 
h l x x X   subject  to  the  budget  constraint 
i
i
i i E y R    ,  where  R
i  is  the  region’s  i 
income and 
i is a lump-sum transfer (either positive or negative) set by the central government. We 
adopt  standard  assumptions  for  the  U()  function:  it  is  increasing  in  y  and  X  and  strictly 
quasiconcave, as well as that all goods are normal. In order to maximize the utility function subject 











y x E SMS   , .  The  social  welfare  maximization  implies  that  the 
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3  Social welfare and perfect information 
The Central Government can transfer money (by lump sum) from one jurisdiction to the other 
(under the constraint to satisfy the condition for public budget balance) pursuing the goal of social 
welfare improvement. In the case of perfect information we assume that the Centre knows all the 
characteristics of the two jurisdictions as well as the type (high or low) of each jurisdiction. 
In  order  to  improve  the  social  welfare,  the  central  government  can  implement  a  money 
transfer from one region to the other, but the direction of this transfer is not trivial, in fact it might 
move from the high type region to the low or vice versa. The “necessary and sufficient” information 
required to identify the transfer sign is provided by the marginal utility on good y ( y U ) and by the 
















x E E   then i has to be subsidized while j 








x E E  . The transfer has to equalize at the 
margin the utility (with respect to the private good) and the expenditure (with respect to the public 




x E E   is straightforward: since 
good x is a public good, then its production has to be set in order to minimize its producing cost, 
given the optimal amount of public good. In other words the production has to split between the two 
jurisdictions so to contain as much as possible the overall cost. 
 
4  Nash equilibrium 




y x E SMS   , , 
i=h,l. The implication is straightforward: when the good x is a pure public good, it is not possible to 
reach a first best by means of a transfer of money among the jurisdictions, even in presence of 
perfect information if regions are autonomous in their spending decision. In fact a first best might 




*, i=l,h, which 
is tantamount to say that a Leviathan sets (and forces) the optimal values suppressing the regional 
autonomy and assuming jurisdictions as plants of a unique firm. 
It can be shown (see appendix for details) that a money transfer between the two types of 
local governments would yield the following ratio in terms of utility change: 
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  can  turn  to  be  greater,  lower  or  equal  to  zero.  The  transfer  sign  is 




 the transfer should move from the high cost region to the 




 the opposite applies. The transfer that follows the afore-mentioned rule allows for 
a social welfare improvement, even in the context of Nash behaviour. 
 
4.1  Linear prices 
In the case that the second derivative of the cost function with respect to good x, both for l and 




xx E E ), then constant prices for the public good are implicitly 














































































































































































 are always positive (see 




 will be always positive. This result 
implies that it is possible to improve the social welfare transferring money from the high cost region 




x E E   is positive when the j region price for the 
public good is greater than i. In that case both dU
i and dU




This statement shows a very important consequence for the equilibrium. In fact, it turns out 
that,  in  a  Nash  behaviour  framework  and  without  any  central  authority  intervention,  local 
jurisdictions autonomously proceed to transfer money each other, in particular the money transfer 
moves from the high cost region to the low. In other words, in the presence of a pure public good 
and linear prices, then the Nash behaviour approaches the social welfare goal. A money transfer 
allows for a utility increase both for the receiver and the donor. This result coincides with that 
provided by Buchholz and Konrad (1995). 








x E E   (that makes the model to converge to 
the case in which regions face a identical constant prices in the production of the pure public good 
x) then a income redistribution would be ineffective. According to Warr (1983) a redistribution 
among  jurisdictions  would  not  affect  the  overall  level  of  public  good  individually  supplied.   4
Furthermore even the individual consumption of the private good would remain constant regardless 
to the income redistribution. 
4.2  Non linear prices 








x E E E E    ; 0 ; 0 ) the outcome of a autonomous money transfer among governments is still a 
possible  scenario.  Let  consider  the  local  government  i  indirect  utility: 
)] ) , ( ( ), [( max ) , , , (
j i i i i i j i i x e B e R U x e V         , where 
i i i x e B  ) , ( is obtained by inverting 
the cost function  ) , (




e e B e B   . 
By the indirect utility it is possible to derive the condition that makes government i to benefit 
from a autonomous money transfer to j when governments act according to the Nash rule. 












de B U U U
dx
] [  

                 (3) 
In the case that the condition of (3) is met, then the local jurisdiction i might find it profitable 
to autonomously proceed with money transfers to j in order to improve its own utility and in so 
doing improving also the other region utility. As well as in the case of constant prices it emerges 
that the Nash best behaviour moves in the direction of social welfare improvement, even though a 
social welfare optimum is never reachable. 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
In this paper we provide a model in order to analyse the efficient allocation of resources in a 
Nash behaviour context where a pure public good, that shows variable cost in its production, is 
involved. Never a first best outcome is attainable, even under perfect information, when a pure 
public good is provided by local governments that behave à la Nash. However a lump sum money 
transfer  may  yield a welfare  improvement, but the transfer  has to be  set according to the rule 
provided in the paper. In the limiting case of constant and identical (among jurisdictions) price for 
the public good, it emerges the ineffectiveness of any redistribution policy (Warr 1983). On the 
other  hand,  assuming  constant  prices  that  however  varies  among  jurisdictions,  the  outcome  of 
Buchholz and Konrad (1995) is confirmed: the jurisdiction with the higher cost has an incentive to 
make unconditional transfers to the other jurisdiction and, as a consequence, it turns out that the 
Nash behaviour moves in the desired direction of social welfare improvement. 
Furthermore when public good price is non linear then it emerges the quite unexpected result 
that a Nash voluntary transfer among jurisdictions (with a consequent social welfare improvement) 
is a possible outcome. The required condition has been highlighted in the paper and, although this 
condition might turn to be unusual, nonetheless it could occur allowing, in that case, for a social 
welfare improvement (without the need of any central authority intervention). A Nash voluntary 
transfer  (with  non  linear  prices)  takes  place  whenever  the  local  government  income  reduction, 
which in turn implies a loss in terms of utility, is more than compensated by a utility gain originated 
by the overall public good provision. Individuals’ cross elasticities of marginal utility with respect 
to income and expenditure make it a possible scenario. 
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Appendix 
From the first order conditions we derive the best reply function for the two type of jurisdictions. 
Solving the simultaneous system of equations so determined, it is possible to obtain the Nash 
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differentiating the system of first order conditions











































































































































































d E dR dy dx E




































   











































































































   





















































































C E B B





the determinant of which 
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Let’s first assume that a income variation in region i occurs. 
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But using the following information: 














































E   1 . Which in turn implies that:  













   
 
Assuming now that only region j faces a income variation: 
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Considering the utility variation for both regions when a money transfer from i to j occurs:   8
We assume that region i is characterized by higher cost (with respect to region j) in providing the 








x E E E E   ; .  When  a  transfer  between  the  two  regions  occurs,  it  is 
tantamount to say that both regions face a income variation, equal in absolute value, but different in 
sign: dR=dRi =-dRj>0. 
Let’s first assume a income variation in region i: 
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. Thus a money transfer from i to j will cause a utility increase to the j 























































A money transfer from i to j is suitable to produce a utility increase in j when the utility increase in 
the latter (region j) originated by the larger consumption of the private good y is greater than the 
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we may conclude that a money transfer from i to j produces a utility increase for region i when: 

















































Thus, to sum up, a money transfer from a region to the other determines a ratio of utility variation 
equal to: 








 








 
 
j
j
i
j a
x
i
i
j
i j
x
b
y
i
y
i
j
dR
dx
dR
dx
E
dR
dx
dR
dx
E
U
U
dU
dU
1
1
 
 